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A secure additive protocol for card players
Andre´s Cordo´n–Franco, Hans van Ditmarsch, David Ferna´ndez–Duque,
Joost J. Joosten, and Fernando Soler–Toscano∗
Abstract
Consider three players Alice, Bob and Cath who hold a, b and c cards, respectively,
from a deck of d = a+ b+ c cards. The cards are all different and players only know
their own cards. Suppose Alice and Bob wish to communicate their cards to each
other without Cath learning whether Alice or Bob holds a specific card.
Considering the cards as consecutive natural numbers 0, 1, ..., we investigate gen-
eral conditions for when Alice or Bob can safely announce the sum of the cards they
hold modulo an appropriately chosen integer. We demonstrate that this holds when-
ever a, b > 2 and c = 1. Because Cath holds a single card, this also implies that Alice
and Bob will learn the card deal from the other player’s announcement.
1 Introduction
Consider players Alice and Bob each drawing three cards from a deck of seven cards
numbered 0, 1, ..., 6, while Cath, a third player acting as the eavesdropper, gets the
remaining card. One way for Alice and Bob to communicate their cards to each other by
way of public announcements, without informing Cath of any of their cards, is when both
announce the sum modulo 7 of their cards. For example, suppose Alice holds cards 0, 1,
and 2, and Bob cards 3, 4, and 5 (so that Cath holds card 6). Alice would then announce
“3” and Bob would announce “5”. There are five different hands of cards compatible with
Alice’s announcement, namely 012, 046, 136, 145, and 235. From those, Cath, who holds 6,
can eliminate 046 and 136. Cath cannot deduce that Alice has 0, because 145 is a possible
hand of Alice. She also cannot deduce that Alice does not have 0, because Alice’s actual
hand 012 is also a possible hand. Bob’s announcement that the sum of his cards modulo
7 is 5, does not provide additional information. But this is informative for Alice, namely
in order to learn Bob’s cards, Cath already knows Bob’s sum after Alice’s announcement,
because she can derive that from: the sum of all cards, her own card, and the sum of
∗Emails and affiliations: {acordon,hvd,dfduque,fsoler}@us.es, University of Sevilla, Spain; and
jjoosten@ub.edu, University of Barcelona, Spain. Hans van Ditmarsch is affiliated to IMSC (the Institute
of Mathematical Sciences Chennai), India, as a research associate. He is corresponding author. This work
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Alice’s cards. This solution consisting of two modulo-sum announcements is an instance
of what we will later introduce as the 7-ModSum protocol.
The modulo-sum solution for this problem was among the answers to a Moscow Math-
ematics Olympiad problem [7]. In that version, after Alice’s modulo sum announcement,
Bob announces Cath’s card. This answer can easily be shown to have the same infor-
mation content as a consecutive modulo sum announcement by Bob. The problem itself
is much older and originates with Kirkman [6]. There, the solution takes the form of a
design, a collection of subsets of a given set that satisfies certain regulaties [11]. The five
alternative hands of Alice solving the problem above are not a design. But, for the same
card deal as above, Alice’s announcement could also have been that she holds one of seven
triples 012, 034, 056, 135, 146, 236, 245. We note that each card occurs three times in this
announcement and each pair of cards once. It is a design. Instead of 3, 3, and 1 cards,
players Alice, Bob and Cath may hold a, b, c cards. Some general patterns and special
cases of card deal sizes (a, b, c) for which Alice and Bob can communicate their hands
of cards to each other are found in [1]. A complete characterization is not known. The
methods employed in that publication are not numerical (they do not involve modulo sum
announcements).
There is also a relation to the bit exchange problem: is it possible for Alice and Bob
to share a secret bit by public communication? A secret bit is the value of a proposition
commonly known by them, but not know by the ‘eavesdropper’ Cath. For example, let i
be a card held by Alice, then after the execution of the above protocol Alice and Bob share
the value of the secret bit ‘Alice holds card i’. The seminal publication for card exchange
and bit exchange protocols is [5], and additional contributions include [8]. A (single) bit
exchange is easier to accomplish: it suffices to keep the ownership of one card a secret, not
necessarily the ownership of all cards. E.g., if Alice were to announce ‘I have one of 012,
034, 056’, then afterwards Alice and Bob share the value of the proposition ‘Alice holds 1’.
But, of course, it is now known to all that Alice holds card 0.
The crucial difference between our approach and the ones cited above is that we begin
by assigning an algebraic structure to the set {0, . . . , d − 1}. This allows us to describe
protocols in a compact fashion and draw on known combinatorial results, namely, a con-
jecture of Erdo¨s and Heilbronn [4] giving lower bounds of the number of distinct sums of
n-subsets of Z/(d) (later proven by Dias da Silva and Hamidourne [3]), and Bertrand’s
postulate [10], as well as a theorem of Nagura [9], which show that one can always find a
prime number relatively close to a given integer. Below we will formulate these results in
full detail.
Referring to the agents as ‘card players’ is suggestive, because the scenarios we model
are not meant to model any specific game, and the condition of Alice and Bob’s full
knowledge together with Cath’s total ignorance would not be too appropriate, say, for
poker. Rather, the interest of the Russian cards problem is that it gives unconditionally
safe information exchange protocols, as opposed to conditionally safe cryptography which
depends on the assumption that certain problems are of untractably high complexity, such
as prime decomposition. In such protocols, Alice and Bob would be the principals involved
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in the exchange of information, and Cath the spy or eavesdropper (a.k.a. Eve) intercepting
their communications. The authors believe that their work could lead to new methods of
secure information exchange.
In this paper we give general conditions on a, b, c that guarantee that Alice can safely
announce the sum of her cards modulo the smallest prime greater than or equal to d =
a + b + c (that is, without Cath learning whether Alice or Bob holds any given card). In
particular, they hold whenever a, b > 2 and c = 1, except for the cases (3, 4, 1) and (4, 3, 1).
If c = 1 this announcement is also informative, i.e., Alice and Bob will learn the card deal
from the sum announcement of the other player. In §4 we consider the case where the
sum d of all cards is already prime, and in §5 we consider composite d. The exceptional
cases (3, 4, 1) and (4, 3, 1) are treated separately in §6. This is then followed by the main
theorem which incorporates all of these partial results.
2 Secure and informative protocols
Consider a deck D of d cards. We will identify the cards with the natural numbers
0, 1, . . . , d − 1. We say that a deal of a cards for Alice, b for Bob and c for Cath, with
a, b, c ≥ 1 and a+ b+ c = d has card deal size (a, b, c). A, B and C represent each player’s
hand, i.e., the cards that they hold. We can represent the card deal by the collection
(A,B,C).
Consider the domain consisting of all card deals of a certain size (a, b, c), i.e., of all
(A,B,C) with A,B,C ⊆ D, and A,B,C pairwise disjoint. The property that players
initially only know their own cards induces a partition on this domain. The card deals
in the same equivalence class for a player are indistinguishable for that player. A protocol
consists of a finite sequence of announcements by Alice and Bob. These announcements
are supposed to be truthful. An announcement by, e.g., Alice corresponds to a collection
of possible hands of cards A including her actual hand, and the effect of her announcement
is the restriction of the domain of card deals to all deals wherein she has one of those
hands. Subsequent announcements induce successive such restrictions on the domain of
card deals. Given a deal of cards and a sequence of announcements, a player X knows that
a player Y holds a card z, if and only if Y holds z in all card deals indistinguishable for
player X . A player knows the card deal if she knows the ownership of all cards.
E.g., before Alice’s announcement 012 034 056 135 246 above, Bob, who holds {3, 4, 5},
does not know that Alice holds 0, because he considers hands {0, 1, 2} and {1, 2, 6} (among
more) possible for Alice. But after the announcement, Bob knows that Alice holds 0. Before
announcements, all players know the cards in their own hand.
In this work we restrict ourselves to protocols consisting of two announcements. An
announcement by Alice is informative if, whenever Alice can make the announcement, Bob
knows the card deal afterwards. An announcement by Alice is secure if, whenever Alice
can make the announcement, Cath does not know any of Alice or Bob’s cards afterwards.
Similarly for informative and secure announcements by Bob.
3
3 The modulo-sum announcement
For n ≥ d and X ⊆ D,
∑
n
X denotes the sum of the elements of X seen as elements of
Z/(n).
Definition 1 (n-ModSum)
Let n ≥ d be an integer. We define the n-modulo-sum ( n-ModSum) protocol to be that
where Alice and Bob successively announce the sum of their respective cards modulo n.⊣
As they announce a sum, we call it an additive protocol.
Proposition 2 (Information)
The n-ModSum protocol is informative if c = 1. ⊣
Proof We have that ∑
n
A+
∑
n
B +
∑
n
C =
∑
n
D.
Once Alice announces
∑
n
A, Bob can compute the term
∑
n
C from the three other terms
in this equation. In case that C is a singleton, this immediately gives him the value of
Cath’s card. Similarly,
∑
n
B allows Alice to figure out Cath’s card as well, giving both
Alice and Bob knowledge of the entire deal.
The order in which the announcements are made is unimportant, since both agents
announce information that was true at the beginning and that remains true after the
announcement by the other agent. Although obvious in this case, it is a remarkably
characteristic of a protocol: the order of announcements in a protocol can typically not
be altered. E.g., in the protocol where Bob’s response to Alice’s sum announcement is to
announce Cath’s card, the order of announcements cannot be swapped.
From Cath’s perspective, it does not matter whether she learns
∑
n
A or
∑
n
B, since
she can use one to compute the other. In that sense she does not learn anything new in
the second announcement. Suppose Alice is first, then Cath already knows what Bob will
announce after Alice, before he is doing so. She cannot eliminate card deals given Bob’s
announcement. But in another sense she still learns something from Bob’s announcement:
after that, Cath knows that Alice knows the card deal.
If c > 1, the announcement is typically not informative. For example, if Alice, Bob
and Cath each hold two cards respectively, namely {0, 1}, {2, 5}, and {3, 4}, then Alice
announcing that
∑
6
A = 1 does not result in Bob learning Alice’s cards, as they may also
be {3, 4}.
Although the n-ModSum protocol is informative for c = 1, it is not always secure. For
a trivial example, if Alice, Bob and Cath each hold one card, then Cath learns the entire
deal from Alice’s announcement of her card.
The following proposition is a special case of a similar proposition in [1].
Proposition 3 (Reduction)
For n ≥ d, if the announcement of
∑
n
A is secure for deals of size (a, b, c), then the
announcement of
∑
n
A is also secure for deals of size (a, b, c′) with c′ ≤ c. ⊣
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Proof If for some card deal of size (a, b, c′), after the announcement of
∑
n
A, Cath knows
some of Alice or Bob’s cards, then this would be also the case for the card deal of size
(a, b, c) in which Cath additionally holds c− c′ (new) cards
(a+ b+ c′), (a+ b+ c′ + 1), . . . , (a+ b+ c− 1)
and where it is publicly known that she holds these additional cards.
4 The number-of-cards modulo-sum announcement
The case of the n-ModSum protocol where n = d, i.e., the total number of cards, we give
a special name.
Definition 4 (DModSum)
The number-of-cards modulo-sum (DModSum) protocol is that where Alice and Bob an-
nounce the sum of their respective cards modulo d. ⊣
With the following lemmas, we will work our way towards the main result of this section
that for card deals of size (a, b, 1) with a + b + 1 prime, announcing
∑
d
A is secure for
a, b > 2 (Corollary 9). (Given these results, they dually hold for
∑
d
B as well.)
Lemma 5
Let t, d be natural numbers with 0 < t < d−2 and x ∈ Z/(d). Then, there exists T ⊆ Z/(d)
with |T | = t and
∑
T = x. ⊣
Proof There are at least
⌈
d−4
2
⌉
pairs of the form {+c,−c} with c 6= −c and c 6= ±x. The
reason for this is that the only elements that do not belong to one such pair are 0, ±x and,
if d is even, d/2.
Let +c1,−c1, . . . be an enumeration of all these pairs. Then, if t is odd we can take
Tt = {x} ∪
{
+ci,−ci : i <
t− 1
2
}
;
note that t−1
2
≤
⌈
d−4
2
⌉
because t < d− 2.
Otherwise, take Tt = Tt−1 ∪ {0}.
Proposition 6
Announcing
∑
d
A (or, equivalently,
∑
d
B) is secure for all deals of size (a, b, c) if and only
if, for any value of 0 ≤ x < d and any set S ⊂ D of a + b − 1 cards, there are A,B ⊂ S
such that |A| = a, |B| = b and
∑
d
A =
∑
d
B = x. ⊣
Proof First let us prove the ‘if’ direction, and assume the right-hand condition holds.
Suppose that Alice announces
∑
d
A and z is any card that Cath does not hold. We
must show that Cath cannot determine whether Alice or Bob holds z.
Consider the set S = D \ (C ∪ {z}). This set has a+ b− 1 elements.
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Now, pick A′ ⊂ S such that
∑
d
A′ =
∑
d
A and |A′| = a.
In the deal where Alice holds A′, she does not hold z yet the sum of her cards is still∑
d
A, so Cath cannot distinguish between this scenario and the current one. Therefore
Cath cannot correctly conclude that Alice holds z.
Similarly, we can pick B′ ⊂ S with |B′| = b and and
∑
d
B′ =
∑
d
B. Again Cath
cannot distinguish between this deal and the original deal (since the sum of Alice’s cards
does not change either), and Bob does not hold z in this new deal. Hence, Cath cannot
correctly conclude that Bob holds z.
For the other direction, suppose that there is 0 ≤ x < d and a particular set S of
a + b − 1 cards such that there does not exist A ⊂ S with |A| = a and
∑
d
A = x. We
must show that announcing
∑
d
A is not always secure. (The situation is symmetric if the
condition fails for b instead of a, so we only treat this case.)
For such an S there exists a minimal subset T ⊂ D \ S such that there is A ⊂ S ∪ T
with |A| = a and
∑
d
A = x (Lemma 5 guarantees that at least one such set exists, and
therefore there is a minimal one). Observe that |S ∪ T | ≥ a + b as T is not empty and
necessarily T ⊆ A, because of the minimality of T . Then, consider any deal (A,B,C)
where B is an arbitrary subset of S ∪ T \ A and C is the rest of the cards. In that deal,
if Alice announces that
∑
d
A = x then Cath knows that all the cards in T belong to A
because all the cards that Cath does not hold are in S ∪ T and the only way of forming a
set of a cards with sum x is by using all the cards in T (this by minimality).
Therefore the announcement of
∑
d
A is not secure, since Cath would learn at least
one of Alice’s cards. If the corresponding condition for b fails, then by the same argument
Cath would learn one of Bob’s cards. In either case we conclude that the announcement
of
∑
d
A is not secure.
To obtain our main result, Theorem 8, we now combine this proposition with a combi-
natorial theorem, conjectured by Erdo¨s and Heilbronn in [4] and proven by Dias da Silva
and Hamidoune in [3]:
Proposition 7 ([3])
Let d be a prime. For a set A ⊆ Z/(d), denote by Sn(A) the set of all sums x1 + ... + xn
of n distinct elements of A. Then,
|Sn(A)| ≥ min{d, n|A| − n2 + 1}. ⊣
Theorem 8 (Security)
If a+ b+ c is prime, then announcing
∑
d
A (or
∑
d
B) is secure for all deals of size (a, b, c)
if and only if
ab− 2a− b− c+ 1 ≥ 0 and
ab− 2b− a− c+ 1 ≥ 0 ⊣
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Proof By Proposition 6 we need that any set X of a + b − 1 cards has subsets of size a
and b which sum up to all the possible values from 0 to d− 1. This condition holds for a
whenever
|Sa(X)| = d,
which in turn holds whenever
a|X| − a2 + 1 ≥ d,
that is, when
a(a + b− 1)− a2 + 1 ≥ a+ b+ c.
Some simplification takes this inequality to the form displayed above.
Note that the bound is tight because the inequality in Proposition 7 is also tight; we
have that
|Sa({1, 2, . . . , a+ b− 1})| = a(a + b− 1)− a2 + 1,
so if the latter is less than d we have that the announcement of
∑
d
A is not always secure
(by the ‘only if’ direction of Proposition 6).
A similar analysis shows that the second inequality is equivalent to Cath always being
ignorant of Bob’s cards.
Corollary 9
In deals of size (a, b, 1) with a + b + 1 prime, announcing
∑
d
A is secure if and only if
a, b > 2. ⊣
Proof When c = 1, the requisites in Theorem 8 are satisfied iff a, b > 2.
This gives us a full characterization for when the DModSum protocol works when c = 1
and d is prime. In the following section we will show how one can deal with non-prime
values of d.
5 The least-prime modulo-sum announcement
The least-prime modulo-sum protocol is the n-ModSum protocol for n the least prime
greater than or equal to d. In this section we show that for c = 1 and a, b ≥ 3 except for
a = 4 and c = 3, and a = 4 and c = 3, the least-prime modulo-sum protocol is secure.
Consider a card deal with size parameters (a, b, c).
Definition 10 (LPModSum)
The LPModSum (‘least-prime modulo-sum’) protocol is as follows: Alice and Bob announce
the sum of their cards modulo p, where p is the least prime greater than or equal to a+b+c.⊣
We are now ready to obtain our result for the LPModSum protocol for (a, b, 1). The
idea is to find some appropriate c ≥ 1 such that a+ b+ c is prime and (a, b, c) satisfies the
conditions of the Security Theorem 8, then apply the Reduction Proposition 3. First we
need the following properties on the distribution of primes:
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Proposition 11 (Bertrand’s postulate, [10])
For each n > 3, there is always a prime p such that n < p < 2n− 2. ⊣
Proposition 12 (Nagura’s theorem, [9])
For each n > 24, there is always a prime p such that n < p < 6
5
n. ⊣
Theorem 13
For all a, b ≥ 3 except for a = 4, b = 3 and a = 3, b = 4, the LPModSum protocol is secure
for size (a, b, 1). ⊣
Proof We may assume that a ≥ b, as security for (a, b, c) entails security for (b, a, c).
Case 1: b > 3.
Case 1.1: a+ b+ 1 is prime.
Then, the DModSum and the LPModSum protocols coincide and so the security of the
protocol follows from Corollary 9.
Case 1.2: a+ b+ 1 is not prime.
Let p be the least prime number greater than a+b+1 and put c = p−(a+b). By Bertrand’s
postulate for n = a + b we get that there is a prime q such that a + b < q < 2(a + b)− 2
and hence p ≤ 2(a + b) − 3. Then, a + b + c is prime and it is easy to check that (a, b, c)
satisfies the conditions of the Security Theorem 8 (observe that we only need to verify the
first condition since we are assuming a ≥ b).
Namely,
ab− 2a− b− c+ 1 = ab− 2a− b− (p− (a+ b)) + 1
= ab− a− p+ 1
≥ ab− a− (2(a+ b)− 3) + 1
= ab− 3a− 2b+ 4.
Case A: b ≥ 5.
Then, we have (recall that a ≥ b):
ab− 3a− 2b+ 4 ≥ ab− 3a− 2a+ 4 = ab− 5b+ 4 ≥ 5a− 5a+ 4 = 4 ≥ 0.
Case B: b = 4.
Then, we have (recall that a ≥ b = 4):
ab− 3a− 2b+ 4 = 4a− 3a− 8 + 4 = a− 4 ≥ 0.
So, it follows from the Security Theorem 8 that the modulo-sum protocol is secure for
size (a, b, p− (a+ b)) and then the least-prime modulo-sum protocol for size (a, b, 1) is also
secure by the Reduction Proposition 3.
Case 2: b = 3.
Case 2.1: a+ 4 is prime.
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Then, the DModSum and the LPModSum protocols coincide and so the security of the
protocol follows from Corollary 9.
Case 2.2: a+ 4 is not prime.
Let p be the least prime number greater than a + 4 and put c = p − (a + 3). Reasoning
as in case 1.2, it follows from Bertrand’s postulate that p ≤ 2a+3. Nevertheless, now this
upper bound for p does not allow us to verify that the conditions of the Security Theorem
8 hold for size (a, 3, c). Namely,
ab− 2a− b− c+ 1 = 3a− 2a− 3− (p− (a + 3)) + 1 = 2a− p+ 1
≥ 2a− (2a+ 3) + 1 = −2.
However, observe that in order to obtain a value greater than or equal to 0 in the calculation
above it would suffice to improve our upper bound on the prime p to p ≤ 2a+ 1. We will
be able to do this by using Nagura’s theorem for a > 21 and by inspection for 4 < a ≤ 20.
Case A: a > 21.
It follows from Nagura’s theorem for n = a+ 3 that p ≤ 6
5
(a+ 3). But then:
p ≤
6
5
(a + 3) =
6a + 18
5
≤
6a+ a
5
=
7
5
a ≤ 2a+ 1.
Case B: 4 < a ≤ 20.
We can readily compute the actual values of the primes p for all 4 < a ≤ 20 with
a+ 4 not prime. Namely,
a 5 6 8 10 11 12 14 16 17 18 20
p 11 11 13 17 17 17 19 23 23 23 29
2a+ 1 11 13 17 21 23 25 29 33 35 37 41
Note that p ≤ 2a+ 1 holds for all such a’s.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
6 Special cases and final results
We have not dealt with the special cases (4, 3, 1) and (3, 4, 1) yet. Let us analyze the case
(4, 3, 1). For these size parameters, the LPModSum protocol amounts to the announcement
of
∑
11
A, whereas the DModSum protocol amounts to the announcement of
∑
8
A. We
have checked using Haskell (see the Appendix) that:
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• the LPModSum protocol is not secure; for example, if Alice holds 0123, Bob holds
456 and Cath holds 7, then after the announcement of
∑
11
A = 6, Cath learns that
Alice holds card 2; but
• the DModSum protocol is secure.
By symmetry, similar remarks apply for the (3, 4, 1) case. We recall that the (3, 3, 1) case
is an instance of the DModSum protocol, namely 7-ModSum. We can now combine our
previous results to obtain the following:
Theorem 14
For a, b ≥ 3, there is a secure and informative protocol for deals of size (a, b, 1). ⊣
7 Conclusions and future work
Given three card players Alice, Bob, and Cath who hold a, b, c cards, respectively, and
who only know their own cards, we have investigated general conditions for when Alice or
Bob can safely announce the sum of the cards they hold modulo an appropriately chosen
integer. We demonstrate that this holds whenever a, b > 2 and c = 1. Because Cath holds
a single card, this also implies that Alice and Bob will learn the card deal from the other
player’s announcement. We want to continue our investigations for cases where c > 1, and
compare this to incidental results from the literature. The authors believe that their work
could lead to new methods of secure information exchange.
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Appendix: the Haskell script subsets.hs
For input card deal of size (3, 4, 1) the Haskell script subsets.hs in Figure 1 shows that
the d-ModSum protocol is secure. The implemented algorithm is the natural brute force
one. In the general setting of an (a, b, c) card distribution, we firstly define a function
deals :: Int -> Int -> Int -> [[Int]]
so that deals a b c generates all the
(
a+b+c
a
)
·
(
b+c
b
)
possible card deals in an (a, b, c) card
distribution. Next, we define an auxiliary predicate
check :: Int -> Int -> [Int] -> [Int] -> Bool
so that check d k as bs checks whether each card of Alice’s hand as can be interchanged
in an k–tuple with a k–tuple of elements of Bob’s hand bs with the same sum (modulo d).
Finally, combining deals and check we define the main generate and test predicate
secure :: Int -> Int -> Int -> Int -> Bool
so that secure a b c k checks whether for each card deal of an (a, b, c) card distribution
each card of Alice’s hand can be interchanged in a k–tuple with a k–tuple of elements of
Bob’s hand with the same sum (modulo a + b+ c). For card safety we also have to check
secure b a c k, namely that each card of Bob’s hand can be interchanged in a k–tuple
with a k–tuple of elements of Alice’s hand with the same sum.
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import Data.List
-- (subsets n xs) outputs the list of all the subsets of xs of n elements.
subsets :: Int -> [Int] -> [[Int]]
subsets 0 _ = [[]]
subsets _ [] = []
subsets (n+1) (x:xs) = [x:ys | ys <- subsets n xs] ++ subsets (n+1) xs
-- (subsetSum m n xs) outputs the list of all sums (modulo m) of the subsets of xs of n elts.
subsetSum :: Int -> Int-> [Int] -> [Int]
subsetSum m n xs = nub [mod (sum ys) m | ys <- subsets n xs]
-- (deals a b c) generates all the deals in an (a,b,c) card distribution.
deals a b c = [[xs,ys,zs] | xs <- subsets a [0..(a+b+c-1)],
ys <- subsets b ([0..(a+b+c-1)] \\ xs),
zs <- [([0..(a+b+c-1)] \\ xs) \\ ys]]
-- (check m n as bs) checks whether each card of as can be interchanged in an n-tuple with an
-- n-tuple of elements of bs with the same sum (modulo m).
check m n as bs = and [ or [elem (mod (x+y) m) ys | y <- subsetSum m (n-1) (as \\ [x])]| x <- as]
where ys = subsetSum m n bs
-- (secure a b c n) checks whether for each deal of an (a,b,c) card distribution, [as,bs,cs],
-- each card of as can be interchanged in an n-tuple with an n-tuple of elements of bs with
-- the same sum (modulo a+b+c).
secure a b c n = and [check (a+b+c) n as bs | [as,bs,_] <- deals a b c]
-- (secure2 a b c) checks whether for each deal of an (a,b,c) card distribution, [as,bs,cs],
-- there exists some n <= min(a,b) such that each card of as can be interchanged in an n-tuple
-- with an n-tuple of elements of bs with the same sum (modulo a+b+c)"
secure2 a b c = and [or [check (a+b+c) n as bs | n <- [2..min a b] ]| [as,bs,_] <- deals a b c]
Figure 1: The Haskell script subsets.hs
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